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i.

ARGUMENT IN

A. Sworn Complaint
The state makes no attempt to establish that the prosecutor swore, under oath, to
the contents of the formal complaint. State's Br., pp. 4-6. The state also does not defend the
district court's position that the formal complaint was based on the uniform citation-it
clearly was not. Instead, the state argues only that a "written oath appears right in the
amended complaint." State's Br., p. 5 (emphasis added). The state then cites Rule 2.2 of the
fdaho Misdemeanor Criminal Rules ("MCR"). State's Br., p. 5.
Howeve1~ the state does not quote that rule. The state's omission is quite telling,
because MCR 2.2 requires more than the statement contained in the formal complaint.
Therefore, the state is incorrect when it claims that the formal complaint met the
requirements of MCR 2.2. MCR 2.2 states as follows: "Whenever these rules require or
permit a written statement to be made under oath or affirmation, such statement may be
made as provided in Idaho Code Section 9-1406. An affidavit includes a written
certification or declaration made as provided in Idaho Code Section 9-1406." (Emphasis
added).
If the state is correct that the formal complaint satisfied MCR 2.2, then the formal
complaint must have met the requirements of [daho Code section 9-1406. But the formal
complaint did not meet those requirements. Idaho Code section 9-1406 provides:
Whenever, under any law of this state or under any rule, regulation, order or
requirement made pursuant to a law of this state, any matter is required or
permitted to be supported, evidenced, established or proved by the sworn
statement, declaration, verification, certificate, oath, affirmation or affidavit,
in writing, of the person making the same, other than a deposition, an oath
1

or an oath required to be taken before a specified official other
notary public,
matter may with like force and effect
or
by the unsworn
by such person
declaration,
writing, which is
substantially the following form:
"I certify (or declare) under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the
State of Idaho that the foregoing is true and correct" (Emphasis added).

First, MCR 2.2 does not apply. MCR 2.2 only applies "as provided in Idaho Code
Section 9~1406." That section does not apply when the oath must be "taken before a
specified official other than a notary public ...." Here, the oath must be made before the
magistrate. I.C.R. 3 ("The complaint is a written statement of the essential facts constituting
the offense charged. It shall be made upon oath before a magistrate ... :') (Emphasis
added). Obviously, a magistrate is "a specified official other than a notary public:'
Therefore, section 9-1406 does not apply, and hence MCR 2.2 does not apply. 1
Second, even if MCR 2.2 applied, the complaint's language was not substantially
similar to the language of Idaho Code section 9-1406.

rn contrast to the declaration

described in that statute, the formal complaint simply states that the prosecutor "who being
duly sworn, complains and says ...." R. 84. It then concludes with the statement, applicable
to the magistrate, that it was "SUBSCRrBED AND SWORN To before" the magistrate. R. 86.
It is uncontested that the prosecutor never swore to the contents of the complaint when it
was signed. Therefore, the complaint simply makes representations that are contradicted
by the record, namely, (1) that the prosecutor was "duly sworn," and (2) that it was sworn
to before the magistrate. Neither of those things happened.

1

This point was made in the opening brief: but was not addressed by the state. Opening B1:, p. 6 n. 2.
2
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document were "true and correct," and that the statement was made "under penalty of
perjury." l.C. § 9-1406. The complaint contains no guarantee whatsoever about the truth of
the statements therein, nor does it contain a statement that it was under penalty of perjury.
It instead falsely claims that it was "sworn to" before the magistrate when it was
"subscribed." Further, again in contrast to the statute, the complaint tells us nothing about

what was sworn to; therefore, it is not substantially in the form of the statement contained
in Idaho Code section 9-1406. Suffice it to say that, if the complaint's statements were
considered sufficient under the statute, then the language provided by the legislature
would be watered down beyond recognition.
Mr~ McEvoy entered a guilty plea "to the Amended Complaint." R. 113; see, Smith v.
State, 94 ldaho 535, 536 (1972) (stating that the post~conviction relief petitioner "pied

guilty to the information" filed in the underlying criminal case). The amended complaint
was not valid; therefore, there was nothing to which he could plead guilty, and the guilty
plea therefore was not valid.

B. Fundamental Error and Waiver of Issues by Pleading Guilty
The state proffers an alternative argument that M1: McEvoy must establish
fundamental error in order to prevail on appeal. State's Br., p. 5. The state also notes that
any non-jurisdictional defect was waived by the defendant's guilty plea. State's Br., p. 6 n. 3.

However, the state is the party that has waived its arguments. The arguments were waived
at the district court level.
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("where there is a jurisdictional defect, this court has authority to address that issue, even if
it is not raised by the parties themselves.")
Regarding non·jurisdictional issues, the state appears to have misapplied the correct
standard of review. This matter is on appeal from the district court. For nearly a decade,
the Idaho Supreme Court has clarified that higher appellate courts directly review the
decision of a district court that acted in its appellate capacity. Losser v. Bradstreet, 145
Idaho 670, 672 (2008) ("for nearly two decades, we have effectively ignored the structure
of our appellate rules and issued opinions in which we have directly addressed the decision
of the magistrate. [H]enceforth, our decisions will reflect our application of the Idaho
Appellate Rules.")
To the district court, the state never argued that Mr. McEvoy failed to establish
fundamental error. R. 153-161. The district court did not reach that issue eithe1: R.

166-77. To the extent that the state now argues this point, the issue is waived. In fact, even
before Losser, the Idaho Supreme Court would consider the state's arguments forfeited if
they were not presented to the district court acting in its appellate capacity. In State v.

Watkins, for example, the "State contend[ ed] this Court should decline to address the issues
raised by Watkins on the basis that the appeal is untimely and in violation of I.AR. 14(a),

which provides that an appeal must be filed within 42 days of the order appealed." 143
Idaho 217, 220 (2006). The Supreme Court refused to consider the question, stating that
"The timeliness of the appeal from the magistrate court to the district court was not

4
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the district court and wm not be addressed by

Court"

This is a case of "waiving the waiver." Idaho's case law provides that the state cannot
argue the issue of waiver unless it made that argument below. It did not Therefore, it is
the state that has waived its arguments on appeal. Mr. McEvoy has contended that he
cannot plead guilty to an invalid amended complaint To the extent the state maintains that
this argument was waived by Mr. McEvoy's guilty piea, or that Mr. McEvoy failed to establish
fundamental error, the state has waived its argument.
Regardless, as explained, it should be dear that the guilty plea is itself at issue if the
subject of the guilty plea, i.e., the charging document, is defective. See, Smith, supra.

C. Jurisdiction
The state used the term "specious" to describe Mr. McEvoy's argument regarding the
uniform citation. State's Br., p. 6. 2 Unfortunately, the state has misunderstood, and
consequently misrepresented, Mr. McEvoy's argument. SpecificaHy, the state suggests that
Mr. McEvoy's argument is that "all jurisdictional defects involve violations of the procedural
rules and therefore all violations of the rules are jurisdictional ...." State's B1:, p. 6. To
counter this straw man argument-an argument Mr. McEvoy never made-the state
explains that the "applicable legal standard ... requires only a citation 'alleging an offense
was committed within the State of ldaho' in order to confer 'subject matter jurisdiction
upon the court."' State's Br., p. 6 (quoting State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223 (2004)).

2 The state has used several insulting terms to describe Mr. McEvoy's arguments, including "specious,''
"dubious;' and "frivolous." In Mi: McEvoy's opinion, these terms are not warranted by the arguments he has
presented to this Court
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Rather, Mr. McEvoy argues that jurisdiction is lacking when there exists a failure to follow
procedural rules specific to the commencement of a proceeding. Thus, in State v. Lute,
jurisdiction was lacking when the grand jury issued an indictment-the felony equivalent of

a uniform citation-that was in violation of the rules applicable to the issuance of an
indictment. 150 Idaho 837. Because the charge was not properly commenced according to
the rules, there was no jurisdiction. Id. at 841.
As explained already, specific requirements apply to the initiation of a case by
uniform citation. One of those requirements is that the applicable form be used. That
requirement is mandatory. MCR S(g) (a uniform citation "shall be in the following form")
(emphasis added).

In certain respects) that form requires more than what is required for a

formal complaint, indictment, or information. It requires that the citing officer identify the
date of the offense, which is something that did not occur in this case. The procedure

specific to initiating a case therefore was not followed. As a result, the case was not
initiated, because the procedure was mandatory.
Second, the state dearly missed this point when the state argued that the language
in the citation was sufficient to meet the jurisdictional requirements of a charging

document. No doubt, it is true that a charging document must "aHeg[e] an offense was

committed within the State of Idaho" in order to confer subject~matter jurisdiction. But
that standard applies to a different element of the jurisdictional requirements enunciated in

Rogers. The requirement is that "The information, indictment, or complaint alleging an
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matter

upon

court."

In Lute, there VJas no question that the state did "allege an offense was committed in
the State of Idaho." The defect was not the "alleging an offense was committed" element;
the defect was the "indictment" element of jurisdiction. Id. at 841 ("On appeal, the State
devotes much of its argument to the issue of a 'defective indictment' and the effect of a
guilty plea on 'defects' in grand jury proceedings. However, there was no 'defective'

indictment in this case; rather there was no indictment under the law.") (Emphasis
added).
Here, there was no uniform citation under the law. As explained, the prescribed
form is required to be used; it is not discretionary. Thus, the issue is not the allegations

themselves, but the fact that the form was not followed. If the form was not followed, it
was not a uniform citation at all. If no uniform citation \Vas submitted, then the case was
never commenced. The issue is the "uniform citation" requirement, not the "alleging the
offense was committed in the state of Idaho" requirement. The state focused its argument
entirely on a point Mr. McEvoy never made on this appeal. It therefore failed to refute, or
even address, Mr. McEvoy's argument.

D. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
The state argues, for the first tin1e on appeal, that the magistrate's order, which
granted the state's request to view the property, "was the equivalent of a search warrant."
State's Br., p. 10 n. 5. Of course, as explained above, this argument is waived because it was
not raised below. Regardless, it is not true. Warrants may issue only from a "neutra1 and
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difficult to believe that the magistrate could be considered "neutral and detached" when he
was the person performing the investigation itself, in order to inform himself of
information to be used at his own sentencing hearing.
In addition, a warrant must be supported by an affidavit, and no affidavit supported
the state's motion. IDAHO CONST. ART. I§ 17 ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue without probable cause shown by affidavit, particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.") The magistrate s
1

order is not a search warrant.
The state also argues that Mr. McEvoy never waived his Fourth Amendment rights,
and "should have challenged that order as erroneous on appeal and sought the applicable
remedy of suppressing evidence," State's B1~, p. 10-11. The state's argument only highlights
the problem with the guilty plea and resulting search. If Mr. McEvoy's only remedy is
suppression of the evidence, then he would be without any meaningful remedy for the
violation of his rights. Suppression of evidence is rarely allowed for purposes of sentencing.

See, State v. Person, 145 Idaho 293, 300 (Ct. App. 2007) (Lansing, J., concurring). Moreover,

if such a motion were granted, the judge would have been required to pretend that he never

saw the evidence he saw.
Mr. McEvoy argued that the search conducted on his property amounted to a waiver

of his Fourth Amendment rights. Opening Br., p. 10. In other words, it was the equivalent of
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"no Fourth Amendment waiver appears on the record." State's Br., p. 10. The guilty plea
was invalid because it resulted in a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, which was a
direct consequence of his guilty plea.
Interestingly, the state argues that this point was made without citation to authority.
State's Br., p. 10. What Mr: McEvoy argued, however, was that the order was a direct

consequence of his guilty plea, and cited State v. Heredia, 144 Idaho 95 (2007) for that
proposition. Opening Br., p. 11. The magistrate's order fell within the definition of "direct
consequence," and fell outside the definition of "collateral consequence." Opening Br., pp.

10~ 14. Ample authority was provided in support of that argument. The state has not even
addressed the controlling issue on which it falsely claims authority was lacking: whether
the court's order, which violated Mr. McEvoy's Fourth Amendment rights, was a direct
consequence of the guilty plea. It was.

E. Judicial Bias
Defendants will almost never be capable of establishing judicial bias if this case does
not qualify. It is not a case of a judge merely possessing "some knowledge of the facts or
circumstances of a case ...." State's Br., p. 12. This is a case of a judge with a preformed
opinion of the essential facts of the state's case against Mr. McEvoy. The magistrate did not

state merely that he had seen the property; he stated that the property was "horrible" and
that the condition of the property affected him so personally that he was "dismayed" by the
property. Tr. p. 152, IL 13-20.
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McEvoy has

bias, not merely implied bias. As already stated, "actual bias, if disclosed, no doubt would
be grounds for appropriate relief." Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 883
(2009}. It is difficult to imagine a clearer disclosure of actual bias than the disclosure that

occurred in this case.
The state's only argument on this point is the conclusory statement that "the record
does not show actual ... bias:' State's Br., p. 13. But of course, it clearly does.

F. Sentencing
The state does not contest Mr. McEvoy's position that the district court shouid not be
reversed regarding the sentencing issue discussed in the opening brief. State's Br. pp.
13-14; Opening Br., pp. 19-20.

m.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should vacate the defendant's conviction and
remand the case for dismissal; in the alternative, this Court should reverse and remand to
permit Mr. McEvoy to withdraw his guilty plea; in the alternative, this Court should reverse
and remand to allow Mr. McEvoy to be resentenced.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

THlS~f\d
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